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Executive Summary
 In early May 2010 fears that the Greek sovereign debt crisis might prove costly and 
contagious led to the establishment of new lending facilities. The facilities are an 
attempt to allow financially troubled euro area member states to borrow at 
attractive rates. 
 The new facilities have some problems. First, the legal foundation for their existence 
is shaky. Second, the EFSF may have difficulty attaining and maintaining a AAA 
credit rating.
 The rescue plan created over the weekend of 8 – 9 May included both the EFSM and 
EFSF and the ECB’s securities market program. It was followed by an immediate 
drop in sovereign interest rate differentials but these differentials have been drifting 
up since then.
 The history of the Greek debt crisis and the experience with the Stability and Growth
Pact suggest that fiscal criteria are unenforceable, and hence, of little use in 
ensuring financial stability.
 The interest rate differential between Greek and German government bonds was still 
surprisingly low at the end of 2009. Insufficient surveillance and the seeming 
complacency of EU and other policy makers may have played a role. 
 Independent councils of auditors and fiscal experts might improve the ability of 
markets (and voters) to discipline errant fiscal policy makers.
 The permanent existence of facilities such as the EFSM and the EFSF creates a 
serious moral hazard problem by lowering the risk to a sovereign of following a fiscal 
policy that might prove to be unsustainable. 
 Better supervision and regulation would have made the possibility of a Greek 
sovereign default less costly and could also be expected to lower the costs of other 
sovereign defaults.
In this report, I consider the consequences of the establishing the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism and the European Financial Stabilisation Facility. As these these 
institutions are temporary in nature, I consider permanent solutions to support the financial 
stability of the euro area.
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1. The Consequence of the EFSM and the EFSF
In early May 2010 fears that the Greek sovereign debt crisis might prove costly and 
contagious led European Union policy makers to approve three new lending facilities for 
euro area member states in serious financial distress. In this section I describe how the 
facilities work and how effective the the EFSM and EFSF have been.
1.1  The New Lending Facilities 
The first facility is a 110 billion euro support package for Greece, approved on 3 May and 
provided jointly with the IMF, comprising an 80 billion euro facility from euro area countries 
and a 30 billion euro Stand-By Arrangement with the Fund. The second facility is the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) with a volume 60 billion euros. It is 
administered by the European Commission and is similar to the facility that had previously 
been set to help the non-euro area countries Latvia, Hungary and Romania. The third 
facility is the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF): a special purpose vehicle set up 
to make loans to euro area countries, other than Greece, up to an amount of 440 billion 
euros, supplemented with a 250 billion euro IMF commitment. Both the EFSM and the EFSF 
were agreed by ECOFIN the weekend of 8 – 9 May. Clearly the EFSF is potentially the most 
important of these three facilities. Set up as a limited liability company owned by euro area 
member states and located in Luxembourg, it became fully operational on 4 Aug 2010. 
Loans made by both the EFSM and the EFSF have terms and conditions similar to those 
made by the IMF and both of these facilities are temporary: they will make no new loans 
after three years.
1.2 The Rationale for and Problems with the EFSM and EFSF
The rationale for the three new facilities is as follows. Euro area countries have followed 
unsustainable fiscal policies. Greece is facing a sovereign debt crisis and Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy and Spain may be in danger, as well. As a result, borrowing costs for many euro area 
countries are extremely high, tending to make their fiscal situation even worse. The new 
facilities were created by European Union policy makers to lower the borrowing costs of 
financially troubled countries. The idea is that if the euro area borrows as a whole, it can 
get better rates than a troubled country can and it can pass on these rates to this country. 
Unfortunately, the lower borrowing costs come with a political problem. If some euro area 
countries must make good on the euro area’s guarantee as a whole in the case of one or 
more other euro area countries defaulting, then this is a transfer of wealth from these 
countries to one or more others. It may be seen as a violation of the so-called “no bailout 
clause”, Article 125.1 of the Treaty (consolidated version) which says:
The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central 
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed 
by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to 
mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A 
Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central 
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed 
by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without 
prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific 
project.
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In the case of the Greek rescue package, it is likely that expediency overcame the aversion 
that more fiscally prudent countries had toward bailing out more profligate countries. 
German and French banks were highly exposed to Greek debt and these countries feared 
their banking systems would be destabilised by a Greek sovereign default. Other troubled 
euro area countries probably envisioned themselves as possible beneficiaries of similar 
packages sometime in near future. 
The EFSM’s debt is backed by the EU budget; hence, its securities are viewed as good 
quality. However, given article 125.1, this joint and several guarantee raises troubling 
questions about its legality. Its legal justification is supposedly derived from Article 122.2 of 
the Treaty (consolidated version) which states that “[w]here a Member State is in 
difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to the Member 
State concerned.“ However, in the case of the European sovereign debt crisis it is difficult 
to argue that the severe difficulties faced by some member states where akin to being hit 
by hurricanes or earthquakes, rather than being mostly of their own making. Presumably, 
little issue was made of the question of legality because of the small size of this facility. 
The EFSF is an attempt to provide a much larger facility, made more politically palatable by 
changing the nature of its guarantee. It is to work by issuing bonds and using the proceeds 
to make loans. The bonds are guaranteed on a pro rata basis by participating member 
states in a coordinated fashion. That is, instead of a joint and several guarantee, there are 
individual guarantees; as with the the EFSM, there is no collateral. Each country’s share of 
the total guaranteed amount is equal to its share of the ECB’s capital. The total amount of 
the guarantees will cover 120 percent of the debt issued and there is to be an additional 
cash reserve accumulated by fees paid by member states that access the facility. European 
Union politicians hope that it will be given an AAA rating, allowing troubled euro area 
member states to borrow at highly favourable rates. 
Unfortunately, even with the 20 percent extra guarantee, there are obstacles to attaining 
and maintaining the hoped-for AAA rating. First, as shown in Table 1 below, only six of the 
individual member states providing the guarantees have (Fitch) AAA ratings themselves 
and many have dismal credit ratings. Second, the fortunes of the highly indebted Euro area 
countries are correlated. Thus, the quality of the collateral is correlated with the fortunes of 
a potential borrower. Third, debt is issued by the ESFS only after a loan is requested; in 
this scenario the credit worthiness of Euro area countries would likely be even lower than it 
is currently.
Table 1. Euro area credit ratings*
Country Rating Country Rating
Austria AAA Italy AA-
Belgium AA+ Luxembourg AAA
Cyprus AA- Malta A+
Finland AAA Netherlands AAA
France AAA Portugal AA-
Germany AAA Slovakia A+
Greece BBB- Slovenia AA
Ireland AA- Spain AA+
*Fitch, long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Rating
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1.3 How well have the New Lending Facilities Worked?
The new lending facilities, even in combination with dramatic action by the ECB, have failed 
to be the needed panacea to Europe’s fiscal crisis. A measure of the markets’ faith in the 
efficacy of the euro area policy response is provided by the differential between the 
troubled euro area countries’ 10-year government bond interest rates and those of 
Germany, shown in Figure 1, below. As is seen, interest rate differentials spiked in early 
May. Over the weekend of 8 – 9 May European Union policy makers created a rescue plan 
that included the EFSM, the EFSF and the ECB’s “securities market program”: a plan to 
intervene in dysfunctional public and private debt markets. In the face of a crisis, 
immediate but imperfect government action may have a better short-term effect than delay 
in search of a more perfect solution and interest rate differentials fell sharply: the 
immediate threat of sovereign default was averted.  Unfortunately, the effect was short 
lived: interest rate differentials have been steadily drifting up since then. 
Figure 1. Sovereign Interest Rate Differentials*
*10-year government bond spreads vs. Germany, source: Financial Times
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2. What should euro area policy makers do next?
In this section I address the issue of longer run reforms. But, before thinking about what 
institutions Europe needs to ensure the stability of the euro and the financial stability of the 
euro area, it is interesting to ask how the Greek debt crisis came to happen and why the 
existing arrangements did not stop it.
2.1 A Brief History of the Greek Debt Crisis
According to the 2000 IMF Article IV staff report, Greek government budget deficits had 
fallen from 10.2 percent of GDP in 1995 to an estimated 1.8 percent of GDP in 1999, while 
Greek government debt had fallen from an estimated 108.7 percent to 104.6 over the 
same period. While apparently satisfying the Maastricht criterion that the budget deficit 
must be less than three percent of GDP, Greece was clearly in violation of the criterion that 
debt must be less than 60 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, it was welcomed into the euro 
area under the allowed pretext that the ratio was “sufficiently diminishing and approaching 
the reference value at a satisfactory pace”.
In 2004 it was revealed that, as seen in Table 2 below, Greece had, through some 
combination of ineptness and underhandedness, misrepresented its data. Greek 
government budget deficits had never fallen below the three percent target in the years 
1997 – 2003 and government debt was expected by the IMF to be 112 percent of GDP in 
2004; it had fallen little over the previous few years. Not only had Greece failed to satisfy 
the Maastricht criteria but it was in flagrant violation of the Growth and Stability Pact.
Table 2. Greek Data in 2004, before and after revision*
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Government budget deficits (as a percentage of GDP)
Unrevised 4.0 2.5 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.7
Revised 6.6 4.3 3.4 4.1 3.7 3.7 4.6
Government debt (as a percentage of GDP)
Unrevised 108 106 105 106 106 105 103
Revised 114 112 112 114 115 113 110
*Revised data is from Feb 2004, Source: IMF, Greece: 2004 Article IV Consultation: Staff Report.
At the end of September 2006, under pressure to improve its fiscal performance, Greece 
announced that after including its informal economy, its GDP was actually about 25 percent 
higher than previously thought. Thus, its debt was really only 85.3 percent of GDP. Despite 
the new numbers, in 2008 Greece announced a preliminary government budget deficit of 
5.0 percent of GDP and debt that had grown to 98 percent of GDP: a continued violation of 
the Pact. Even this was untrue: in November of that year, the government admitted that 
the budget deficit was actually 7.7 percent of GDP and that it would be 12.5 percent in 
2009, rather than the previously reported 3.7 percent. Eurostat later revised the 2009 
figure to 13.6 percent. Government debt in 2009 was reported to be 115.2 percent of GDP.
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2.2 The Greek Debt Crisis and the History of the Euro Area suggest that Fiscal 
Targets are not a Solution
Throughout the current crisis, policy makers have discussed improving the functioning of 
the Stability and Growth Pact as a way of ensure financial stability in the euro area.1
However, an important lesson from the Greek crisis is that policy makers lack the political 
will to enforce fiscal targets, at least for west European countries. Despite their remarkable 
squeamishness in refusing Lithuania entry to the euro area when it violated the inflation 
criterion by a hair’s breadth, they were unable to deny Greece entry when it was in obvious 
violation of the fiscal criteria. 
This lesson is reinforced by the histories of most of the other members of the euro area.  
Prior to the liquidity and credit crisis (in 2006), Greece, Italy and Portugal were running 
government budget deficits equal to 3.6, 3.3 and 3.9 percent of GDP, respectively. Even 
Germany has regularly breached this target. More importantly, as seen in Figure 2, below, 
nine out the 16 current Euro area member states had debt that was over 60 percent of GDP 
in 2006; ten were in violation in 2009. 
Figure 2. Debt as a Percentage of GDP*
*Source: ECB
Fiscal criteria are never going to function as intended unless violators are punished. As the 
experience of Greece and the history of administering the Pact has shown, this is not 
currently politically feasible. 
                                               
1 See, for example, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Central Bank, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region, 
Reinforcing Economic Policy Coordination, Brussels, 12 May 2010. 
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2.3 What does the Greek Debt Crisis say about Markets’ Ability to Police 
Sovereigns?
It is interesting to ask why the markets allowed the Greek debt crisis to happen. It seems 
remarkable in hindsight that interest rates on Greek sovereign debt did not rise sharply 
long before they did. If the markets had forced Greece to pre-emptively restructure its debt 
in, say, 2004, the impact on Europe would have likely been much smaller than it would be 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Greece would have been forced to curtail its 
borrowing and those who invested in Greek debt would have paid for not being more 
vigilant. Perhaps other fiscal policy makers and investors would have become more 
cautious. Markets, however, remained stunningly serene: the interest rate differential 
between 10-year Greek and German government bonds hovered at around half a percent 
through 2007. By the end of 2008 it had reached 2.25 and was only 2.41 at the end of 
2009. Greek sovereign 9-year CDS rates did not rise above 100 basis points until late 
2008.
The interest rate response suggests that a lesson from the Greek debt crisis is that markets 
cannot be expected to discipline errant policy makers. This may not be true, however. A 
lack of good policy making and may have hindered the market’s ability to function 
effectively. I provide two examples of how this might have occurred and explain what can 
be done to improve matters. It should also be noted that this same lack of good policy and 
intervention may also have rendered Greek voters complacent.
2.4 Better Surveillance is needed
First, markets lacked the data to make informed judgements. Greece has consistently been 
responsible for wildly inaccurate fiscal data: the market may have thought that the 
situation was less dire than it actually was. One way to remedy might be to appoint an 
independent committee of experts that would audit the fiscal accounts and plans of each 
member state.2
Second, the complacency of policy makers, who may have been perceived as being better 
informed, may have led markets to think that things were less serious than they were. Euro 
area policy makers, however, were apparently unwilling or afraid to speak out. The ECB 
blithely continued to accept Greek sovereign debt on the same terms it accepted German 
sovereign debt: there was no additional haircut for liquidity risk. Outside of the euro area, 
it must have been obvious to the IMF as far back as 2004 that Greece was likely headed 
toward disaster, but the Article IV reports are restrained. One solution to this problem 
would be the creation of an independent fiscal council that would allow a non-political 
expert evaluation of national budgetary plans.3 Perhaps Article IV reports should not have 
to be approved by the IMF Board. Academic economists – who rarely feel constrained in 
saying what they think – might be rewarded less for doing blue sky research and more for 
doing policy analysis.
                                               
2 See Burda, Michael and Stefan Gerlach (2010), “A Credible Stability and Growth Pact: Raising the bar for 
budgetary transparency,” in Baldwin Richard, Daniel Gros and Luc Laeven, eds., Completing the Eurozone 
rescue: What more needs to be done?, VoxEU.org.
3 See Fatás, Antonio, Jurgen von Hagen, Andrew Hughes Hallett, Anne Sibert  and Rolf R Strauch (2003), Stability 
and Growth in Europe: Towards a Better Pact, CEPR.
Anne Sibert - The EFSM and the EFSF: Now and what follows
8
2.5 It should be more Costly for Governments to Follow Bad Fiscal Policies
If euro area policy makers cannot be forced to follow a fiscal policy that is likely to be 
sustainable, then it should be made in their best interests to do so. As previously noted, 
the EFSM and EFSF will make no new loans after three years. This is probably a good thing. 
The problem in the Euro area is that too many countries have borrowed too much. Facilities 
that allow them to borrow more at attractive rates are not the long-run solution to the 
problem. Indeed, the permanent existence of such facilities creates a serious moral hazard 
problem by lowering the risk to a sovereign of following a fiscal policy that might prove to 
be unsustainable. 
A usual counterargument is that such facilities protect countries that would be solvent if it 
were not for contagion. In the current crisis there exists a possibility that a Greek default 
might make runs on countries that have similar features to Greece – Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain – focal. The existence of lending facilities lowers the cost of looking like Greece. 
However, their absence would lower the likelihood of a country following a rash fiscal 
policy: the possibility of runs on the debt of countries that look like Greece may be a 
valuable commitment device for countries that choose not to look like Greece.
In addition to expected bailouts increasing the likelihood of default, they may be another 
reason that markets did not react to the ballooning Greek debt. Many traders must have 
possessed a (not entirely irrational) belief that Greece would be rescued. 
2.6 Make Sovereign Defaults less Costly
Sovereign defaults are possible, even when policies are sound. Thus, euro area policy 
makers should take steps to ensure that the euro area financial system is less vulnerable to 
sovereign defaults. The likely reason that a Greek default is seen as so costly is the heavy 
exposure of some euro area countries’ banking systems to Greek debt. The Greek debt 
crisis may be – to a great extent – a German and French banking crisis in disguise. The 
solution to this is better supervision and regulation of national banking systems.
